Military Innovation in the Interwar Period

This is a book that looks at a variety of important tactics between the wars. It also looks at the militaries that were involved with those tactics development. It also takes a look at how militaries innovate and why some succeed and others fail. It is a just read for any WW 2 fan. Any one in the military who works with change would get a lot out of the book. Also anyone working in a bureaucracy would also like it. It is very interesting from many perspectives: military, history, innovation, or how to affect change.

This book was written as a study to draw attention to the decisions at the various levels of warfare (tactical, operational, and strategic) that led to success and failure of those countries involved in WWII. Before reading this book I would watch WWII movies wondering why certain tactics were not being utilized. Well, this book answers many of those questions and a whole lot more. Great Read, in-depth study, and well researched as it provides invaluable incite of how innovation influenced operations on land, in the air, and at sea.

Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, Edited by Williamson R. Murray and Allan R. Millett is a very interesting little book covering a variety of technical and doctrinal innovations that were pivotal in how WWII was fought. The book is essentially a series of essays, each of which forms a chapter of the book and provides a detailed analysis of one technical or doctrinal issue. Doctrinal topics addressed include: Armored Warfare, Amphibious Assault, Strategic Bombing, Close Air Support. Technical issues of RADAR, Aircraft Carriers and Submarines are also examined. Finally three essays on innovation in general tie the book together thematically. Each of the essays is written by a historian and each provides a very thorough but concise examination of its topic. I was particularly impressed with the chapter on Aircraft Carriers and the one on RADAR. The Aircraft Carrier chapter examined the parallel development tracks of the USN, the RN and the IJN. The thesis of the chapter is that the different development path taken by the RN (heavily armored flight/hanger decks which resulted in restrictions on the number of aircraft the carrier could operate) while influenced by the expectation that British Carriers would operate within the range of land based air, was primarily driven by the fact that the formation of the RAF toward the end of WWI, stripped the fleet of "air enthusiasts". Once all of the air minded naval officers transferred to the nascent RAF, there was no one left in the fleet thinking about carriers as major weapons systems in their own right. Instead the carriers were relegated to scouting and air defense roles. Similarly, the RADAR essay Illustrates how the Germans started with a substantial lead in RADAR technology, but lost it when they failed to undertake the technical research necessary to perfect centemetric RADAR. All in all, this was a very interesting book on a series of topics that were vitally important to WWII. However, it is a bit dry and the topics are highly technical and fairly esoteric. Although I enjoyed it, you have been warned.

Book was in better condition than expected and arrived super fast!

A great series of essays on topics with clear parallels today. The examination of choices made within the national strategy, bureaucratic institutions and service inertia is very refreshing.

A collection of essays on Military developments amongst the future major combatants of WW2. Specifics are slim,more of a conceptual study,and decidedly dry in places. Reads more like a college text book at the service academies.

This is a series of essays. You don't have to read the entire book. The essay on interwar innovation in carrier aviation in particular shows the importance of innovation and outlines critical factors in the success or failure of American, British, and Japanese carrier aviation in World War II. The principles are easily transferred to any organization even if the specifics vary.

If you even have a modest interest in military history or in how the interpretation (or misinterpretation) of history can and in fact was used to shape the outcome of a major global event (WWII) then you will find this book very interesting.

この本は、編集者のマリー博士はじめ欧米の著名な軍事史専門家たちが、第一次大戦終了後から第二次大戦が始まるまでの平和な２０年間（戦間期とも呼ばれています）に、欧米列強が軍事的イノベーションのためにどのようなことに努力し、あるいは全く努力を怠ったのかと言う観点でケーススタディを行ったものです。第一次大戦は悲惨な戦争でしたが、戦訓に対する戦後の取り組みは各国まちまちでした。その中でもドイツは、厳しい軍備制限の中で母国生存のために電撃戦や近接航空支援などの理論を発展させていきます。その努力はすさまじい限りと言ってもよいでしょう。そのほかにも戦略爆撃や水陸両用戦、そして日本の空母機動部隊のことも書かれており、各章ごとに読んでもきわめて参考になること請け合いです。ＲＭＡというと何か大きな出来事のように思えますが、この本を読むと実は組織の下位レベルでもイノベーションを創造できることがよくわかります。